State of Utah v. Harry Miller : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
State of Utah v. Harry Miller : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
W. Andrew McCullough; Attorney for Appellant.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Mark Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Craig N.
Stranger; Salt Lake District Attorney's Office; Counsel for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Miller, No. 20100792 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2522
Case No. 20100792-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
HARRY MILLER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
Appeal from a guilty plea to attempted possession or use of a 
controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, the Honorable William 
Barrett presiding 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
6885 South State St., Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84047 
Counsel for Appellant 
CRAIG N. STANGER 
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
Counsel for Appellee 
Oral Argument Not Requested f\\S*> c o ^ S 
f*9\, # 
tf* &» 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No. 20100792-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
HARRY MILLER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
Appeal from a guilty plea to attempted possession or use of a 
controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, the Honorable William 
Barrett presiding 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
6885 South State St., Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84047 
Counsel for Appellant 
CRAIG N. ST ANGER 
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
Counsel for Appellee 
Oral Argument Not Requested 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES...... 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WHERE 
DEFEND ANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE PLEA WAS NOT 
KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY 9 
A. Because the trial court strictly complied with rule 11 in taking 
Defendant's plea, Defendant's plea was presumptively 
knowing and voluntary 12 
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, where 
Defendant has not shown that the plea was entered 
unknowingly and involuntary. 13 
1. Defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court had an 
independent affirmative duty to determine whether he was 
represented by retained counsel before appointing counsel 
fails because Defendant does not argue plain error on 
appeal and, in any case, his claim is inadequately briefed 14 
2. Defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court's denial 
of his motion to withdraw violated his right to counsel of 
choice fails because Defendant does not argue plain error 
on appeal, his claim is not adequately briefed, and his claim 
is not supported by the record 17 
•i-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, where 
Defendant's claim that he pled to an invalid offense lacks merit 21 
1. Contrary to Defendant's claim, the plain language of the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act recognizes that the attempt 
provisions of the Criminal Code are "fully applicable" to 
possession of a controlled substance .....23 
b. Defendant's unpreserved claim that there can be no attempt 
to possess a controlled substance where there is no 
evidence that such a substance exists fails as contrary to the 
law ...25 
CONCLUSION ...................26 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A: Constitutional Provision, Statutes, and Rules 
Addendum B: Order (denying Petition for Interlocutory Appeal) 
Addendum C: Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and 
Certificate of Counsel 
Addendum D: Transcript of Plea Hearing 
xA^ddendum E: Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
Addendum F: Transcript of Sentencing/Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New 
York, 4A7 U.S. 557 (1980) . 22 
Hill v. LocWiflrt/474U.S.52(1985) .....22 
Morris v. Sloppy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) 19 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 23 
United States v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1987) ....19 
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) 19 
STATE CASES 
People v. Konyack, 471 N.Y.S.2d 699 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) 19,20,21 
State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT1, 63 P.3d 731 18,19 
State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42,140 P .3d 1288 2,4 
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997) 15 
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63,95 P.2d 276.. passim 
State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 55 P.3d 1131 23 
State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987) ..10 
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1 P.3d 1108 10,12, 20, 22 
State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, 63 P.3d 72 15,17,18 
State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712 (Utah App. 1997) 15,16 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,10 P.3d 346 14,16,17 
State v. Johnson, 774. P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) .14 
-iii-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,12 P.3d 92 23 
State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58,27 P.3d 1115 14 
State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355,246 P.3d 151.. 15,17,18 
State v. Miller, 2004 UT App 445n.4,104 P.3d 1272, .........25 
State v. Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38,227 P.3d 1264 ....23 
State v. Perry, 2009 UT App 51,204 P.3d 880 22 
State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15,114 P.3d 551 .......14 
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995) .14 
State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9,154 P.3d 788 16,18 
State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, 72 P.3d 138 25 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998) 15,17,18 
State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1992) 12 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. VI ..2 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 (West Supp. 2010) 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2010) 2,22 
: ' ' • • • • . • . • • i 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8.5 (West 2004)....... ..2,24 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (West 2004) 2, 24,25 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West Supp. 2010) 2,10 , 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009) 1 
Utah R. App. P. 11 8,12 
Utah R. App. P. 24 15,17,18 
-iv-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No. 20100792-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
HARRY MILLER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a guilty plea to attempted possession or use of a 
controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2010) and 76-4-101 (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea? 
1
 This brief cites to the current criminal code, as amendments to statutes 
following the events in this case do not affect the resolution of issues raised on 
appeal. 
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Standard of Review. The trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, f 7, 
140 P.3d 1288. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES 
The following constitutional provision and statutes are attached at 
Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. VI; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2010); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8.5 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (West Supp. 2010); 
UtahR.Crim.P.11. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 1,2009, Defendant was near 271 West 200 South in Salt Lake 
City, where Salt Lake City Police Officer Mike Hamideh was working 
undercover as a "dealer/7 Rl-2. Officer Hamideh approached Defendant and 
asked," Amigo roca?" a common term for "rock" cocaine. R53; 72:3. Defendant 
replied, "Yeah, I'd like $10 worth" and showed him his money. Id. Defendant 
was arrested. R72:3. When Officer Hamideh searched Defendant, he found $12 
in Defendant's pocket. Id. The attempted drug transaction occurred 432 feet 
from a church. Id. Defendant was charged with attempted possession or use of 
-2-
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a controlled substance, enhanced to a third-degree felony because the offense 
was committed within 1000 feet of a place of worship. Rl-2. 
On November 2,2009, W. Andrew McCullough entered his appearance as 
Defendant's retained counsel. R4. Soon afterward, Mr. McCullough moved to 
dismiss the information on the grounds that "attempted possession of a 
controlled substance is not a proscribed offense/' and that an attempt to possess 
drugs in a drug free zone was an " invalid enhancement" where there were no 
drugs at the scene. R16-22. 
On January 11,2010, Judge Barrett denied the motion. R31. On or about 
January 21,2010, Mr. McCullough filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with 
this Court seeking review of the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. 
R38,40. On February 26,2010, this Court denied the petition, and the case was 
remitted back to the trial court. See Order, R41-43 (Addendum B). 
No action on the case appears in the record until July 28, 2010, when 
Defendant made an initial appearance before Judge Medley. R47. The court 
found Defendant indigent and appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association to represent Defendant. R47. There is no transcript of the 
proceeding in the record, and the minute entry does not reflect any reference to 
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the status of Mr. McCullough's representation of Defendant by either Defendant 
or the court. Id. A roll call was scheduled for August 3,2010. R48. 
On August 2, appointed counsel, Andrea Garland, entered her 
appearance and filed preliminary discovery requests. R62-68. The following 
day, on August 3, Ms. Garland appeared with Defendant before Judge Toomey. 
R60; 82:2. Neither the minute entry of that hearing nor the transcript of the 
proceedings reflect any reference to the status of Mr. McCullough's 
representation of Defendant by Defendant, Ms. Garland, or the court. R60-61; 
82:2-7. At that hearing, Defendant pled guilty to attempted possession or use of 
a controlled substance after the State agreed to remove the enhancement, thus 
reducing the offense to a class A misdemeanor. R52-60; R82:2-7. 
Judge Toomey incorporated Defendant's Statement in Support of Guilty 
Plea into the plea taking. See R 52-59, at 53-55 (" Affidavit/' attached at 
Addendum C); R82:3-5 ("Plea Hearing" transcript attached at Addendum D). 
Defendant's Affidavit stated: "I have not waived my right to counsel." Id. at 54. 
Defendant acknowledged that his attorney was "Andrea J. Garland." Id. He 
also swore that he "believe [d] himself to be of sound and discerning mind and 
to be mentally capable of understanding these proceedings and the 
consequences of [his] plea"and that he was "free of any mental.. . impairment 
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that would prevent [him] from understanding what [he] was doing or from 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering [his] plea." R56. Defendant 
also swore that he was "satisfied with the advice and assistance of [his] 
attorney." Id. 
The trial court accepted Defendant's plea and "based on the facts set forth 
in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the Defendant and counsel, 
and based on any oral representations in court," the court found that 
Defendant's guilty plea was "freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made." R59. 
On September 14,2010, Mr. McCullough moved on Defendant's behalf to 
withdraw Defendant's guilty plea. See Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, R69-70 
(Addendum E). Mr. McCullough argued that Defendant should be able to 
withdraw his plea because, although he was represented by retained counsel at 
the time, he was represented by appointed counsel at the plea hearing. R69-70. 
Mr. McCullough asserted that he would not have advised Defendant to plead 
guilty because "the charged office does not exist," but that, when Defendant had 
last appeared in court," [Defendant] was told that counsel had withdrawn." Id. 
The motion to withdraw, however, did not include an affidavit from Defendant 
supporting Mr. McCullough's contention. Id. 
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On September 20, 2010, Mr. McCullough appeared with Defendant at 
sentencing before Judge Barrett. See Transcript of Sentencing, R83:2-8 
(Addendum F). Mr. McCullough first addressed the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea, reiterating the same facts set out in the motion and noting that the 
record did not contain his withdrawal in the case. Id. at 3. In an attempt to track 
any oversight, Judge Barrett reviewed the proceedings from July 28: 
The Court: Then let's see, he was - - July 28th he was arraigned, 
and I don't know that any - - that [Defendant] advised anybody 
or if it's on the record anywhere that he advised that you were 
still representing him. I don't know. It just shows here that he 
was appointed an attorney by Judge Medley. 
Mr. McCullough: I didn't know. Nobody told me a thing. 
The Court: He should have said something. 
Mr. McCullough: He should have, your Honor. I think he was 
confused. I think he was led somewhere to believe that I had 
withdrawn. 
The Court: Well, there's nothing in the record here that shows 
that. It just shows he was appointed an attorney, and there's no 
indication of any kind of a withdrawal or anything. If someone 
hadn't told Judge Medley, all he's looking at is the Information. 
So he wouldn't know that you represented him. 
< 
Mr. McCullough: Well, I understand that, but you know, 
obviously if I had known I [sic] had been here. 
The Court: Well, I appreciate that. 
i 
Id. at 3-4 (brackets added). 
-6-
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At that point, Judge Barrett asked if Defendant wanted to withdraw his 
guilty plea. Id. at 4. After initially suggesting that he would like to convert 
Defendant's guilty plea to a Sen/—a conditional—plea, Mr. McCullough 
renewed Defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Id. at 5. At first, the 
court stated that a hearing would be required, but immediately reconsidered its 
suggestion: 
The Court: [I]t's a problem because he was represented by an 
attorney and we went through the colloquy with him and we 
have -- she went through the long form with him. 
Mr. McCullough: I understand that, your Honor, but 
The Court: And then he entered his plea. 
Mr. McCullough: The crime to which he pled does not exist. 
The Court: Well, that's your position, but he pled to it and I'm 
going to - -1 accepted the plea. So unless you can convince me 
that the appellate court in a written opinion is going to say that 
it's - -• there's no such crime, he's stuck. 
Mr. McCullough: Well, they are going to say that, your Honor, 
if you'll give them a chance. 
The Court: No. No. I'm not going to allow him to withdraw his 
plea. What do you want to do about sentencing? 
Id. at 5-6. Defendant agreed to be sentenced immediately. Id. at 6. The court 
sentenced Defendant to a statutory term of one year in jail, but suspended the 
sentence and placed him on probation for eighteen months. Id. at 8; R74-75. 
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Defendant timely appealed. R76. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In doing so, Defendant does not claim 
that the trial court violated rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, when 
it took his plea. Rather, Defendant claims that other factors rendered his plea 
unknowing and involuntary. 
First, Defendant asserts that his plea was not knowing and voluntary 
because he was represented by appointed counsel at the time of his plea, even 
though he was still represented by retained counsel. Defendant claims that the 
trial court should have independently reviewed the record to determine 
whether Defendant was represented before appointing counsel. Defendant 
alternatively claims that the trial court's appointment of counsel while he was 
represented by retained counsel violated his right to counsel of choice. 
Neither of Defendant's specific claims were preserved below. Thus, for 
this Court to reach them, Defendant must argue that plain error justifies their 
review. Because Defendant has not argued plain error, this Court should 
decline to reach his claims. In any case, because Defendant has not cited any 
case law clearly governing his claims, Defendant's plain error claims fail 
-8-
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because he has not shown that the court's errors, if any, should have been 
obvious, as is necessary to prevail on a plain error claim. In other words, 
Defendant's claims fail as inadequately briefed. 
Alternatively, Defendant claims that his guilty plea was unknowing and 
involuntary because he pled to a crime that does not exist, especially where the 
drugs he sought to buy did not exist. This claim fails as a matter of statutory 
construction. By statute, the attempt provision of the criminal code applies to 
the crime of possession of a controlled substance. Also by statute, the fact that 
Defendant attempted to possess drugs that did not exist does not constitute a 
defense to his attempt charge. 
ARGUMENT 
• • I . 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WHERE 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOWTHATTHE PLEA WAS NOT 
KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Aplt. Br. at 9-14. Defendant argues first 
that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was represented by 
appointed counsel rather than his previously retained counsel. Id. at 10. 
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Defendant argues second that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because 
the crime to which he pled was not actually a crime. Id. at 13-20. 
"A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the 
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made/7 Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West Supp. 2010). "A 'withdrawal of a plea of guilty 
is a privilege, not a right. . . [and] is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court."" State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 9,1 P.3d 1108 (quoting "State v. Gallegos, 
738 P.2d 1040,1041 (Utah 1987)). "[The reviewing court] will not disturb the 
trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea unless it clearly 
appears that the trial court has exceeded its permitted range of discretion." Id. 
Here, Defendant's first claim fails because it was not preserved below and 
Defendant does not argue plain error on appeal. It also fails because it is not 
-10-
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adequately briefed. Defendant's second claim fails because it is contrary to 
Utah's statutory law.2 
2
 Defendant attempts throughout his argument to magnify the trial 
court's alleged abuse of discretion by speculating as to its resultant harm on a 
tangential matter. Aplt. Br. at 7-8, 10, 12. He notes that the prosecutor 
represented at the plea hearing that Defendant's rap sheet appeared to indicate 
that Defendant might have been convicted of a first degree felony for which 
Defendant served three years in prison. Aplt. Br. at 10-11 (citing R82:7). 
Defendant asserts that, unlike the prosecutor, Mr. McCullough knew that that 
charge had been dismissed. Aplt. Br. at 12-13. (In fact, the presentence 
investigation report (PSI) does show that a conviction for a first degree felony in 
2000 was reversed on appeal and the case dismissed on July 6, 2007. R72:4.) 
Therefore, Defendant suggests, if the trial court had not overlooked that he was 
still represented by Mr. McCullough, Mr. McCullough would purportedly have 
informed the court that the first degree felony had been dismissed, and the court 
"might" not have held Defendant in jail pending the sentencing. Id. 
The Court should not consider Defendant's repeated recitation of this 
matter because it is irrelevant to the issues raised on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 7-8, 
11,12. The prosecutor's erroneous comment, made after Defendant had pleaded 
guilty, see R82:6, has no relation to whether Defendant's plea was involuntary. 
Moreover, Defendant acknowledges that even if the trial court had been 
informed correctly concerning the first degree felony, the court "might" still 
have held him in jail following his guilty plea, a decision Defendant does not 
even challenge on appeal. Aplt. Br. at 11. 
The Court should also disregard Defendant's reference to alleged 
additional facts and proceedings surrounding the dismissal of his first degree 
felony— claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to the dismissed 
felony and the subsequent filing of an innocence petition, see Aplt. Br. at 7-8 — 
because those alleged facts and proceedings are not of record and are also 
irrelevant to the issues raised on appeal. 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Because the trial court strictly complied with rule 11 in taking 
Defendant's plea, Defendant's plea was presumptively knowing 
and voluntary. 
Under rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[t]he cour t . . . . may 
not accept the plea until the court has found the plea is voluntarily made7' 
with knowledge that certain constitutional rights are waived and particular 
conditions apply in pleading guilty. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2), -(4)(A), -(5). 
"Strict compliance with rule 11(e) creates a presumption that the plea was 
voluntarily entered/7 Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,111 (citing State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 
746, 748 (Utah App. 1992)). 
Here, Defendant does not claim any rule 11 deficiency in the trial court's 
taking of his plea, and the record of the plea, in conjunction with Defendant's 
affidavit, shows that Defendant's plea was taken in strict compliance with rule 
11. See Affidavit, R52-59 (Addendum C); Plea Hearing, R82:2~7 (Addendum D); 
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 12, 95 P.2d 276 ("When reviewing the trial court's 
denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the reviewing court 
may consider the record of the plea proceedings, including the plea colloquy 
and plea affidavit or statement/'). 
-12-
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Consequently, Defendant's plea was presumptively knowing and 
voluntary. As discussed hereafter, Defendant's claims do not undermine that 
presumption. 
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, where 
Defendant has not shown that the plea was entered unknowingly 
and involuntary. 
Implicitly conceding that his guilty plea was taken in strict compliance 
with rule 11, Defendant nevertheless contends that his plea was "not fully 
informed or voluntary" because the court appointed new counsel even though 
he had previously been represented by retained counsel. Aplt. Br. at 12. 
Defendant appears to argue that the trial court had an independent, affirmative 
duty to determine whether he was already represented by retained counsel 
before appointing counsel. See id. at 10,12-13. Defendant alternatively appears 
to argue that appointment of counsel when Defendant was represented by 
retained counsel violated his right to counsel of choice. See id. at 12. 
Defendant's first claim fails because it was not preserved below and is 
inadequately briefed. Defendant's second claim fails because it was not 
preserved below, is inadequately briefed, and is contrary to the record. 
-13-
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1. Defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court had an 
independent affirmative duty to determine whether he was 
represented by retained counsel before appointing counsel 
fails because Defendant does not argue plain error on appeal 
and, in any case, his claim is inadequately briefed. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or 
some form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the 
trial court record before an appellate court will review such claims/" State v. 
Johnson, 77 A P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted); accord State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74,111,10 P.3d 346. "Moreover, the issue must be 'sufficiently raised 
to a level of consciousness before the trial court and must be supported by 
evidence or relevant authority/" State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, | 13, 95 P.3d 276 
(citation omitted). The preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . unless a 
defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' 
occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, | 11. If a defendant "does not argue that 
exceptional circumstances or plain error justifies review of the issue," this Court 
will "decline to consider it on appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 
(Utah 1995); accord State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45,114 P.3d 551; State v. Mead, 
2001 UT 58, 35, n.5, 27 P.3d 1115. This Court also "will decline to consider a 
defendant's plain-error arguments... if defense counsel 'led the trial court into 
-14-
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error/" State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712,716 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted); accord 
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 (Utah 1997). 
In addition, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly 
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. 
Gomez, 2002 UT 120, | 20, 63 P.3d 72 (citation omitted). Thus, "'[a] brief is 
inadequate when it merely contains bald citation[s] to authority [without] 
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority/" 
State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355, | 32,246 P.3d 151 (citations omitted); accord 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (stating that briefs must contain reasoned analysis 
based upon relevant legal authority). "It is well established that a reviewing 
court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. 
Tnomas, 961 P.2d 299,304 (Utah 1998). 
In this case, Defendant never claimed below that the trial court has an 
independent affirmative duty to determine whether an indigent defendant has 
retained counsel before appointing counsel for him. See R70; 83:2-8. In fact, 
Defendant implied just the opposite when he agreed with the trial court that 
(1) at his initial appearance, the trial court would be looking only at the 
information, i.e. not retained counsel's prior filings (R83:4), and (2) Defendant 
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should have informed the court that he had retained counsel. R83:3. 
Consequently, Defendant invited any error in the trial court's not finding such 
an affirmative duty, and this Court should decline to consider his claim on 
appeal. See Hall, 946 P.2d at 716. 
At a minimum, because Defendant did not preserve his claim below, 
Defendant must argue plain error before this Court will consider it. See Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, ^ [ 11. Defendant does not argue plain error on appeal. See Aplt. Br. 
at 9-14. See also State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, f 11,17 & n.2,154 P.3d 788 (to prevail 
on plain error claim, defendant must show: "'[1] [a]n error exists; [2] the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and [3] the error is harmful"') 
(citation omitted). Thus, again, this Court should decline to consider his claim. 
Finally, even if this Court reaches the merits of Defendant's plain error 
claim, it still fails. Most importantly, Defendant does not cite any case law 
holding that a trial court has an independent affirmative duty to determine 
whether an indigent defendant has retained counsel before appointing counsel 
for him. See Aplt. Br. at 9-14. Thus, Defendant has not shown that the trial 
court's error, if any, should have been obvious. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, Tf 
16, 95 P.3d 276 ("To establish that [an] error should have been obvious to the 
trial court, [Defendant] must show that the law governing the error was clear at 
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the time the alleged error was made."). Consequently, Defendant's plain error 
claim fails under the obvious error prong. See id. Alternatively, Defendant's 
failure to cite clear governing law renders his plain error claim inadequately 
briefed. See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304; Millard, 2010 UT App 355,132; Gomez, 2002 
UT 120, f 20; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
2. Defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court's denial of 
his motion to withdraw violated his right to counsel of choice 
fails because Defendant does not argue plain error on appeal, 
his claim is not adequately briefed, and his claim is not 
supported by the record. 
Alternatively, Defendant appears to claim that the trial court's denial of 
his motion to withdraw violated his right to counsel of choice. See Aplt. Br. at 
12-13. 
Before entering his plea, however, Defendant never claimed that his 
counsel of choice was previously retained counsel. See R83:3. In addition, 
Defendant never argued as part of his motion to withdraw that the absence of 
his retained counsel at the plea hearing violated his right to counsel of choice. 
See R83:2~8. Thus, Defendant's claim is unpreserved, and Defendant must argue 
plain error on appeal before this Court will consider it. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
[^ 11. Defendant does not argue plain error on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 9-14. 
Consequently, this Court should not consider Defendant's claim. 
-17-
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Even if this Court reaches Defendant's claim, however, it fails. First, 
Defendant cites no case law holding that, despite a Defendant's silence as to 
retained counsel, a trial court violates an indigent defendant's right to counsel of 
choice by appointing counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 12-13. Defendant, therefore, has 
not shown a violation of his right to counsel of choice, let alone an obvious 
violation of that right. Thus, Defendant's plain error claim fails because 
Defendant has not shown that the error, if any, should have been obvious to the 
trial court. See Powell, 2007 UT 9, t 11, 17 & n.2; Dean, 2004 UT 63, | 16. 
Alternatively, Defendant's failure to cite clear governing law renders his plain 
error claim inadequately briefed. See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304; Millard, 2010 UT 
App 355, t 32; Gomez, 2002 UT 120, % 20; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
In any event, Utah case law rejects Defendant's contention. "The accused, 
although guaranteed the right to counsel by the Sixth Amendment, does not 
have the absolute right to counsel of his or her own choosing." State v. Arguelles, 
2003 UT 1, Tf 87, 63 P.3d 731 (rejecting that trial court erred in removing 
defendant's originally appointed counsel with whom defendant had apparently 
established a relationship of trust) (citation omitted). "The Sixth Amendment 
entails a limited right to select and be represented by an attorney of one's 
choosing; however, 'the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an 
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effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a 
defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers/" Id. 
(quoting WJieat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). "Thus, when 
considering Sixth Amendment claims, 'the appropriate inquiry focuses on the 
adversarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his lawyer as such/" 
Id. (quoting United States v. Cronic, ±66 U.S. 648, 657 n. 21 (1984) and Morris v. 
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (holding that there is no Sixth Amendment right to "a 
meaningful attorney-client relationship")). See also United States v. Freeman, 816 
F.2d 558,564 (10th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that "right to counsel does not imply 
an absolute right to counsel of one's choice) (citations omitted); People v. 
Konyack, 471 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (recognizing that 
defendant's discharge of retained attorney on day of sentencing because 
attorney allegedly did not adequately represent him "in no way evidences a lack 
of voluntariness to the plea"). 
Finally, Defendant's claim fails because the record does not support his 
belated contention that retained counsel was his counsel of choice. It is true, as 
Defendant notes, that he was initially represented in this case by retained 
counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 6,10. However, there was a period of several months 
after that representation during which the case stalled. R.137:31,41,47. Then, 
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at Defendant's initial appearance, Defendant made no mention of his prior 
retained counsel, let alone that his prior retained counsel was his counsel of 
choice. R47. To the contrary, Defendant apparently completed all the steps 
necessary to find him indigent and, therefore, eligible for appointed counsel. Id. 
The reasonable inference from Defendant's conduct is that his prior retained 
counsel was not his counsel of choice.3 
And that inference was strengthened by Defendant's and appointed 
counsel's representations at Defendant's plea hearing. Defendant was 
represented at the plea hearing by appointed counsel, Andrea Garland. R82:2. 
At the hearing, Defendant swore to the following salient points: (1) he had not 
waived his right to counsel (R82:54); (2) his attorney was "Andrea J. 
Garland"(id.); (3) his entry of a guilty plea was "of [his]own free will and choice 
(id. at 56); (4) he was 56 years of age, had attended school through the 11th 
grade, and could read and understand English (id.); (5) he "believe[d] himself to 
be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding 
these proceedings and the consequences of [his] plea"(zd.); and (6) he was "free 
3
 In further support, the trial court expressly rejected counsel's 
suggestion, that Defendant had been led to believe at his initial appearance that 
retained counsel had withdrawn, when the court observed there was nothing in 
the record to support counsel's allegation. R83:3-4. 
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of any mental. . . impairment that would prevent [him] from understanding 
what [he] was doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering 
[his] plea" (id.). Particularly, Defendant swore that he was "satisfied with the 
advice and assistance of [his] attorney/7 Id. In addition, at the hearing, the trial 
court confirmed that Ms. Garland had reviewed Defendant's Affidavit with him, 
that she believed that Defendant understood the Affidavit and the nature of the 
proceedings and the charges against him, and that she did not know of any 
reason why Defendant should not then plead guilty. R82:2-3. 
The record, therefore, does not support Defendant's contention that, at the 
time he entered his plea, his previous retained counsel was his counsel of choice. 
For this reason also, Defendant's counsel of choice claim fails. 
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Defendants motion to withdraw his guilty plea, where 
Defendant's claim that he pled to an invalid offense lacks merit 
Finally, Defendant claims that the trial court should have allowed him to 
withdraw his plea because appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
allowing him to plead guilty to a crime that does not exist. See Aplt. Br. at 15-20. 
In support, Defendant argues that (1) attempted possession of a controlled 
substance is not a recognized offense under Utah law, Aplt. Br. at 15-18, and 
(2) there can be no attempt to possess a controlled substance where "there [is] no 
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evidence whatsoever that any drugs actually existed/' Aplt. Br. at 17-20.4 
Defendant's first claim is contrary to the express provisions of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act. His second claim is unpreserved and lacks merit in 
any event. 
"The usual test for evaluating ineffective assistance claims 'applies to 
challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel/" State v. 
Mondragon, 2002 UT App 329U at *1 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 
(1985)). "To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
demonstrate both that 'counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment,' and that 'counsel's 
deficient performance was prejudicial.'" State v. Perry, 2009 UT App 51, f^ 12, 
4
 Defendant also cursorily claims that "telling [an officer] that he would 
like some drugs . . . is protected speech under the First Amendment." Aplt. Br. 
at 16. Because Defendant provides no legal authority to support this claim, this 
claim is inadequately briefed; therefore, the court should not consider it. See 
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 7 (noting inadequacy of appellant's brief where brief 
failed to provide "meaningful legal analysis" and "merely contained] one or 
two sentences stating his argument generally... and then broadly conclude [d] 
that [appellant] is entitled to relief"). In any case, the law is well-settled that to 
be protected by the First Amendment, commercial speech "at least must concern 
lawful activity." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of 
New York, 447 U.S. 557,566 (1980). The possession, purchase, or sale of cocaine 
is not lawful. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-4, 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2010). 
Therefore, it is not protected under the First Amendment. 
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204 P.3d 880 (quoting State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19,12 P.3d 92, citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687(1984)). 
Here, it is unnecessary to consider the second Strickland prong, because 
appointed counsel was not ineffective in pursuing a legally untenable claim. See 
State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 38, 55 P.3d 1131 (noting failure to establish 
either Strickland prong is fatal to an ineffective assistance claim); State v. 
Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38,113,227 P.3d 1264 ('"[N]either speculative claims nor 
counsel's failure to make futile objections establishes ineffective assistance of 
counsel/") (citation omitted). 
1. Contrary to Defendant's claim, the plain language of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act recognizes that the attempt 
provisions of the Criminal Code are "fully applicable" to 
possession of a controlled substance. 
Defendant argues that attempted possession of a controlled substance is 
not a crime, because the attempt provisions of the Utah Criminal Code do not 
apply to provisions of the Utah Controlled Substances Act (the Act) and that Act 
does not otherwise define attempted possession as a crime. Aplt. Br. at 15-18. 
This claim ignores the express provisions of the Act. 
The Controlled Substances Act provides that "[ujnless specifically 
excluded in or inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the provisions of 
Title 76, Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this 
-23-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
chapter/7 UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8.5 (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the Criminal Code's attempt provisions, found in section 76-4-101, 
are "fully applicable" to the crime of possession unless "specifically excluded 
in" the Act or "inconsistent with the provisions" of the Act. Defendant has not 
cited any provision in the Act that excludes application of the attempt 
provisions. See Aplt. Br. at 15-20. Nor has Defendant shown that application of 
the attempt statute to unlawful possession is inconsistent with any provision of 
the Act. See id. 
In fact, this Court has recognized the offense of attempted possession or 
use of a controlled substance, even in circumstances other than those in which 
the defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced controlled substance offense. See 
Aplt. Br. at 16-17 (implying that attempted possession crime exists only in guilty 
plea context so that defendant can plead to lesser crime); see State v. Nunez, 2001 
UT App 388U at *2 (recognizing that after defendant purchased and sought to 
share marijuana with another person, there was "evidence in the record 
supporting a conviction for a lesser offense of attempted possession"); State v. 
Renaga-Gutierrez, 2002 UT App 111U*2 (addressing challenge to trial court's 
denial of request for jury instructions on attempted possession and solicitation 
of a controlled substance). 
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In sum, Defendant fails to establish that attempted possession or use of a 
controlled substance is not a valid offense. 
b. Defendant's unpreserved claim that there can be no attempt 
to possess a controlled substance where there is no evidence 
that such a substance exists fails as contrary to the law. 
Defendant further contends that the act of asking for a controlled 
substance, when there is no evidence that such a substance exists, is not a crime. 
Aplt. Br. at 17. Defendant, however, did not raise this claim in his motion to 
dismiss, his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, or his argument at the hearing 
on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. See R18-22, 69-70; 83:2-8. Nor has 
Defendant argued plain error on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 15-20. Therefore, the 
Court should decline to consider Defendant's claim. See State v. Miller, 2004 UT 
App 445,^ 4 n.4,104 P.3d 1272 (declining to consider unpreserved issue where 
defendant did not argue exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal), 
cert, denied, 124 P.3d 251 (Utah 2005); State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, If 12, 72 
P.3d 138 (same). 
In any event, the claim is frivolous. The law is firmly established that "[a] 
defense to the offense of attempt does not arise . . . due to factual or legal 
impossibility if the offense could have been committed if the attendant 
circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be/7 UTAH CODE ANN. § 
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76-4-101(3)(b) (West 2004). Thus, Defendant's prosecution for attempted 
possession was valid, even though the drugs he sought did not in fact exist. 
Appointed counsel, therefore, was not ineffective in allowing Defendant to 
plead to the crime. 
* * * * * 
In sum, Defendant has not overcome the presumption that his guilty plea 
was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Thus, Defendant has not shown that 
the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw is 
plea. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted June *ffi, 2011. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. Vl-Jury Trials 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of the United States 
"lAnnotated 
^Amendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & Annos) 
••Amendment V I . Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
U.C-A. 1953 § 58-37-8.5 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
l lChapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos) 
•*•§ 58-37-8.5. Applicability of Title 76 prosecutions under this chapter 
Unless specifically excluded in or inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the provisions 
of Title 76, Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this chapter. 
Laws 1997, c. 64, 5 7, eff. May 5, 1997. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
"HChapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos) 
•*§ 58-37-8 . Prohibited acts—Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or 
dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of any 
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, Chapters 
37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more 
persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any 
other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection ( l ) (a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or I I , a controlled 
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule I I I is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I I I or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection ( l ) (a)( i i ) or (iii) may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact 
finds a firearm as defined in Section 76- 10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or 
in his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court 
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection ( l ) (a)( iv) is guilty of a first degree felony 
punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which 
may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person 
is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or 
a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a 
practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, 
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied 
by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those 
locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or I I , marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, 
but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the 
plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a conviction 
under Subsection ( l ) (a ) , that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances 
not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is 
guilty of a class 5 misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of 
property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or 
other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
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(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of 
six months to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not 
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the person's body any 
measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing 
serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in Subsection 
(2)(h)(i i), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule I I is guilty of a second degree 
felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-
4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules I I I , IV, or V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily injury or death 
as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation of Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g) whether or 
not the injuries arise from the same episode of driving. 
(3) Prohibited acts C—Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license 
number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose 
of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent oneself to be, a 
manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized 
person; 
(il) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, to 
obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to 
acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance by 
misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose receiving any controlled substance from 
another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written 
order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to 
utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of 
this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, 
imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of 
another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to 
render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D—Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter 
who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah 
Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is 
upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier 
of fact finds the act is committed: 
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(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those 
schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any 
of those schools or institutions; 
(Mi) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at 
the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution 
under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (i i); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10- 501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or 
parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in 
Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act 
occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or distribution of 
a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility 
as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be 
imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been 
established but for this Subsection (4) would have been a first degree felony. 
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible 
for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than a 
first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is 
guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. This 
Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, 
and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with the 
mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, 
commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of 
Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) I t is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly 
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware 
of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the 
act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where 
the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections ( l ) (b ) and (2)(c), a plea of guilty or 
no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance under Title 77, Chapter 2a, 
Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently 
reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, notwithstanding a 
charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this chapter. 
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(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any 
civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, conviction 
or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution 
in this state. 
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or 
persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or 
substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the 
character of the substance or substances. 
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of the 
veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or 
administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an 
assistant or orderly under the veterinarian's direction and supervision. 
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses an 
imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered 
practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of the officer's 
employment. 
(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as defined 
in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona fide traditional 
ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in 
Subsection 58- 37-2( l ) (w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in Subsection 
58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, possessed, or 
transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the 
practice of a traditional Indian religion. 
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense under 
this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than 10 days prior to trial. 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause shown, 
if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a 
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to the 
charges. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 
Laws 1971, c. 145, §8; Laws 1972, c. 22, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 29, § 6; Laws 1979, c. 12, § 5; 
Laws 1985, c. 146, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 196, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 92, § 100; Laws 1987, c. 190, § 
3; Laws 1988, c. 95, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 50, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 56, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 178, § 1; 
Laws 1989, c. 187, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 201, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 161, § 1: Laws 1990, c. 163, S§ 
2, 3; Laws 1991, c. 80, S 1: Laws 1991, c. 198, 5 4: Laws 1991, c. 268, S 7; Laws 1995, c. 284, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
S 1. eff. May 1. 1995: Laws 1996. c. 1. S 8. eff. Jan. 31 . 1996: Laws 1997. c. 64. 6 6. eff. Mav 
5. 1997: Laws 1998. c. 139. S 1. eff. Mav 4. 1998: Laws 1999. c. 12. S 1. eff. Mav 3. 1999: 
Laws 1999. c. 303. 5 1. eff. Mav 3. 1999: Laws 2003. c. 10. 5 1. eff. Mav 5. 2003: Laws 2003. c. 
33. 5 6. eff. Mav 5. 2003: Laws 2004. c. 36. 5 1. eff. March 15. 2004: Laws 2005. c. 30. S 1. eff. 
Mav 2. 2005: Laws 2006. c. 8. S 4. eff. Mav 1. 2006: Laws 2006. c. 30. 5 1. eff. Mav 1. 2006: 
Laws 2007. c. 374. 5 1. eff. April 30. 2007: Laws 2008. c. 295. 6 1. eff. Mav 5. 2008: Laws 
2009. c. 214. S 3. eff. Mav 12. 2009: Laws 2010. c. 64. 5 2. eff. March 22. 2010. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
U.CA. 1953 § 76-4-101 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
"Hchapter 4. Inchoate Offenses fRefs & Annos) 
"IPart 1. Attempt 
•*•§ 7 6 - 4 - 1 0 1 . Attempt--Elements of offense 
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he: 
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime; and 
(b)(i) intends to commit the crime; or 
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an awareness that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly corroborates the 
actor's mental state as defined in Subsection ( l ) (b ) . 
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed if the attendant 
circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-4-101; Laws 2004, c. 154, S 1, eff. May 3, 2004. 
U.CA. 1953 § 77-13-6 
Tide 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
"^Chapter 13. Pleas fRefs & Annos) 
**§ 77-13-6 . Withdrawal of plea 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a 
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in abeyance, shall 
be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be announced unless the 
motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made 
within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection (2)(b) 
shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 65, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 16, 6 1; Laws 2003, c. 290, 5 1, eff. 
Mav 5, 2003: Laws 2004, c. 90, S 91 , eff. May 3, 2004: Laws 2008, c. 3, S 251, eff. Feb. 7, 
2008. 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
"Hutah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
RULE 1 1 . PLEAS 
(a ) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, 
unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead 
until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
( b ) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or 
guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason 
of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court 
shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d ) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A 
defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than 
felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a 
written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and 
may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right 
to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right 
to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is 
entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the 
charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to 
which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, 
what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the 
plea; and 
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(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written 
statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, 
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot 
understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or 
translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise 
concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
( f ) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be 
the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g ) If the defendant pieads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a misdemeanor crime 
of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the 
defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the defendant to 
possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render 
the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or 
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other 
charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court. 
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the 
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
( i ) ( l ) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made 
by the prosecuting attorney. 
(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance 
of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and 
defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea 
agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either 
affirm or withdraw the plea. 
( j ) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a 
conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, 
on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial 
motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
( k ) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other 
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if 
the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
( I ) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. Any 
variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall 
be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral 
attack on a guilty plea. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS f |LEQ ilSIUCf 6(tt|RT- ' S 
ooboo—-
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Harry Miller, 
.. Defendant . and Petitioner. 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 1 - 2010 ^ 
bMLf LMKfc CUUN'I > 
By 
tf^sm- DSputyT^SrT 
Case No. 20100053-CA 
Before Judges Davis, McHugh, and Bench.1 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to 
appeal is denied. 
Dated this day of February, 2010 
FOR THE COURT: 
£vfyi 6 Trie 
Carolyn B. McHugh, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
1. The Honorable Russell W. Bench, Senior Judge, sat by special 
assignment pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102 (2008) and 
rule 11-201(6) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
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*k 
fiy, *» 
J 
''rn 
^fffo Wt*i 
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UT. 
* ' ' • • ^ % 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IWirm Mor - . 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No .Q^H^^G 
.1 -ss^J iereh^ 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
- Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
A. 
B. 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
Degree 
Oh frL JA V/i4^i9-)£rr\ 
C Q^J^cAjji A ^ i, In <-fa*4^a^ 
Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
Mjnimum Mandatory 
D. 
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- Ihave received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
e elements of the crime(s)to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
' '"'^ftrWs M) —cfojnM po^S^^nx^ 
an i fe!#7-1 '^u& $ "W^e. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
wMcEr^ provide a basis for the courtlS accept my guilty*" 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or 
n o c o n t e s g ^ I g J ^ ^ : f
 b / ( / Q ^ Q^f ^ [4^JQL 
Qj-crrV^A^.1 " u/^W-c/n^r > , ' a^psj M«- A V / / ^ •, 
*ftmA%&; Jhco,i" Isjhtr MA\\py saj'd ulUtifa; f//J Wu %&, Jfoc<\?" ksjAr MA War* Sfo;d ' lUtnA, V /< ^j0* V H6 tuVlfo^ r^fr; vv 2TsAm^J <fo — i 
— 6 H y 62^ ^ K, QU ^ _ CeLjJ* , m l # lA^cn^rfH^M 
" ' ' i i f i i 'I; "' / " 'ill r ^ " / . ~ t s s > i J 7 A ^ * .J.^ if JM 
UA SA i £- L Jyp C*\JAA$\A , 0 ^ \ 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights / 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
/(have) waived my right to counseL,JfThave waived my rigfit to counsel, 
I navTHone so knowingly, intelligently^and^oluntarily for the following reasons: 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
f / 
/ 
If I have waived my rigljHo counsel, I certify tha(t IJiave read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of ihe charges and<cnmes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest), I alsp/understand my rights ha this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s)C 
<- I ]_»• r r 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is Jfb\(JH^%SJ / 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
^-HIXX™i^ (unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and 
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to 
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses 
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony 
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would 
pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose 
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also 
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal 
to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty 
(or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my 
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
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element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict ' 7 
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up. 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I understand that if I wish 
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is 
entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty^! will be subjectingmyself to serving* 
a mandatory penai^^ 
both
- * )ttft offtiaHsL, )/U2^uz 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victimfs my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate.. ;• J 
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. . ' • ' • Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (jij)are) (is/are not) the result of 
a plea agreement between my self and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: ~ \ ,.i_. " . ^ IJ * I / k 
07/»fl <MM f)\<^iJA^^^\ri^. i/icm^biA, 
^W\WJAsV(UniU4J: frys <WOU> C $M> SU 
iV-3 a r\yrJ<? kmA<,APjM^un^n>/i 
Irial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of \ oluntariness • . 
• _ I arn entering this jriea ofmyown free 'willjindxhoice. No force, threats,, or iMawfuL 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my- attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
^ A f i 
I amyO years of age. I have attended school through the _l grade. I can read 
and understand the English language; If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment." 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning "mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand 
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be 
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest I will only be allowed to withdraw 
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any 
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. * 
Dated this ^2_ day of I^UUlA^ 20(0. 
\c^//M/UJ 
DEFENDANT / 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for
 m , the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
l l l : u s ^ of its" 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant ir^the foregqipg affidavit, ,are 
accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. 
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
Mrf[-*is ^ defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of 
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats, or coercion, 
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before 
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the Dleafs) is/are entered and that the 
acceptanceof the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
PROSE£UpfG ATTORNEY 
BarNTT'Tte^y 
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Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and tihe certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, tihe Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Form revised 6/25/03 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on August 3, 2010) 
3 MS. GARLAND: Your Honor, my next matter is Harry 
4 Miller. He's in custody. 
5 THE COURT: Case No. 091908376. Ms. Garland? 
6 MS. GARLAND: Your Honor, on this matter Mr. Miller is 
7 going to be pleading guilty to a Class A Misdemeanor. After you 
8 take his plea I'd like to address you concerning his custody 
• 9 status. 
10 THE COURT: That would be an attempt? 
11 MS. GARLAND: Yes, your Honor. It would still be an 
12 attempt. They're just taking off the --
13 THE COURT: Oh, I see, the enhancement. 
14 MS. GARLAND: — location enhancement, yes. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Has the statement been 
16 prepared? 
17 MS. GARLAND: It has. 
18 THE COURT: Have you reviewed it with Mr. Miller? 
19 MS. GARLAND: Yes, I have. 
2 0 THE COURT: Do you believe he understands it? 
21 MS. GARLAND: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Does he understand the nature of these 
23 proceedings and the charges against him? 
24 MS. GARLAND: Yes. . 
25 THE COURT: Have you also had an opportunity to review 
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his constitutional rights? 
MS. GARLAND: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is there any reason why he shouldn't 
plead guilty today? 
. MS. GARLAND: No. 
THE COURT: Mr. Miller, have you had the opportunity to 
read the statement before you? 
MR. MILLER: Yes, sir — y e s , ma'am. 
THE COURT: Do you understand it? 
MR. MILLER: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Are you thinking clearly today? 
MR. MILLER: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand the charge that's 
brought against you? 
MR. MILLER: Yes, ma'am, I do. 
THE COURT: Do you acknowledge the truthfulness of the 
things that are put in that statement? 
MR. MILLER: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Gardner, will you give me 
the factual basis for the plea? 
MS. GARLAND: Yes, your Honor. On the 1st of October of 
2009, Mr. Miller attempted to purchase from an undercover officer 
$10 worth of cocaine, and this happened in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
THE COURT: Is that what happened? 
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1 MR. MILLER: Yes, ma'am. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Lopresto, is there anything 
3 the State would like to add? 
4 MR. LOPRESTO: No, Judge. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Miller, do you understand that at trial 
6 you're presumed innocent and that the State would have to show 
7 that you committed the crime that you're charged with here beyond 
8 a reasonable doubt, you would have the opportunity to have 
9 Counsel represent you appointed at State expense, and you could 
10 cross examine any witnesses they call. You'd also have the right 
11 to present witnesses in your own behalf. 
12 You could testify if you wanted to. If you didn't want 
13 to you couldn't be forced to. If you decided not to, it couldn't 
14 be held against you in any way. If you were to be convicted by 
15 a unanimous jury, you'd also have the right of appeal. If you 
16 plead guilty today you're giving up those important 
17 constitutional rights. Is it still your desire to plead guilty? 
18 MR. MILLER: Yes, ma'am. 
19 THE COURT: The other thing is that at the time of 
20 sentencing, even if the State recommends something else, the 
21 Court has the ability to impose a sentence of not more than 
22 one year, a fine of $2500, plus a surcharge, and to make that 
23 punishment run consecutively or concurrently with any other 
24 sentence you may be serving. Is it still your desire to be --
25 to plead guilty today? 
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. MR. MILLER: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Okay, Sir, you're charged with Count I, ' 
attempted possession or use of a controlled substance, a Class A 
Misdemeanor. How do you plead? 
MR. MILLER: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are? 
MR. MILLER: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. Very well. Please go ahead and 
sign that statement. 
(Witness signs statement of defendant) 
THE COURT: Is a pre-sentence report being requested in 
this case? 
MR. LOPRESTO: Yes, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Miller, you have the right 
to be sentenced in no fewer than two days and no more than 45 
days, but it often times takes longer than 45 days to get a pre-
sentence report. Are you willing to waive your right to be 
sentenced in less than 45 days so that we can get that report? 
MS. GARDNER: You said less. You meant more. 
THE COURT: I'm getting tired. 
MS. GARDNER: I understand. 
THE COURT: I've been on the bench for hours. 
MS. GARDNER: Are you agreeing that they can go a little 
longer than the 45 days if they need to to get the report? 
MR. MILLER: Yeah. 
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THE COURT: You're willing to do that, okay. The other 
thing is that up until the time you're sentenced, you have the 
ability for good cause shown to withdraw your plea. After your 
sentence you can't, so just keep that in mind between now and 
then. 
MS. GARLAND: Your Honor — -• . 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. GARDNER: I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MS. GARDNER: I'm wondering if he might be released on 
this matter. He can stay with his nephew. He's lived in Utah 
off and on for the last 18 years, and he has a brother here as 
well as his nephew, so he has family ties here. He doesn't have 
a job. He draws disability. I don't know if he's got some 
failures to appear. He may have one other one. He may have one 
other case, but I'm not asking you to address that matter, just 
only this one. He understands that his actions between now and 
sentencing will significant affect his eventual sentence. 
THE COURT: Mr. Lopresto? 
MR. LOPRESTO: Judge, if we could hear from pre-trial 
first. 
(Representative from pre-trial services stands away from 
microphone and some of her statements are inaudible) 
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Your Honor, we're not recommending 
(inaudible) pre-trial. Most recently he spent the last year in 
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Louisiana. He had only been in Utah one day when he got picked 
upon these charges, and he only (inaudible) local tie, the 
nephew. 
THE COURT: Right. 
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Right. So Mr. Lopresto, I assume that 
you're not recommending it either? 
MR. LOPRESTO: Judge, my understanding is defendant has 
a multi-state criminal history. I don't have a copy of that. I 
only show three incidents in the State of Utah, but it looks like 
one of which might have been a 1st Degree Felony robbery where he 
did about three years in prison. I just can't tell from the rap 
sheet. 
THE COURT: All right. The thing for me that is 
important in my decision to deny your request, Mr. Miller, is 
that absence of really strong local ties. I do realize that you 
have some family here, and that's good, and I hope that they can 
assist you in navigating you through this, but that combined with 
the fact that you don't have a job makes me think that I cannot 
exercise my discretion in this way, even though this is a Class A 
Misdemeanor at this point. So your request is denied, but we'll 
give you a sentencing date, okay? 
COURT CLERK: It will be September 20th at 9 o'clock with 
Judge Berrett. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEA 
DISTRICT eOURf 
10SEFU PM5:33 
TH
'
RD^0iCiAl DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, LgL.C. (2170) i 
Attorney for Defendant DEPUTY CLERK [N ~ 
6885 South State Street, Suite 200 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 565-0894 
IN THE' THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
•• Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARRY MILLER, : Case No. 091908376 
Defendant. : Judge Barrett 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the Defendant in the above action and moves the 
Court for an Order allowing Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. 
This counsel made a written appearance in behalf of defendant some 
months ago. Defendant was, however, out of the State. Defendant 
returned to the State without informing counsel, and was arrested 
on the outstanding warrant. 
When Defendant appeared in Court, he was told that counsel had 
withdrawn; and he was appointed a public defender. A plea was 
entered and sentencing was set. Counsel was informed that Defendant 
1 
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had already been sentenced. This Motion was not filed earlier 
because counsel believed it was too late. This Motion is being 
filed immediately upon it being determined that sentencing has not 
yet occurred. 
Defendant has a valid defense to the charge. He has previously 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the charge, as the offense of "attempted 
possession" is not contemplated under the statute. A Memorandum is 
on file in support of that contention; and it is counsel/s 
intention to appeal any guilty verdict on the grounds that the 
charged offense does not exist. 
It is in the interest of justice to allow Defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea, which would not have been made if counsel 
had been informed of the previous Court appearance. Any error in 
this case was on the part of the Court, in informing Defendant that 
his counsel had withdrawn. 
\ilVv-
DATED this \ ' \ \ day of September, 2010. 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L..L.C. 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Defendant 
•2 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on September 20, 2010) 
MR. STANGER: Judge, could we call the Harry Miller 
case? 
THE COURT: Miller? Uh-huh. I've got that right here. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Andrew McCullough for the defendant, 
your Honor. 
MR. STANGER: Craig Stanger for the State. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Your Honor, I believe this matter is 
before the Court on sentencing, but I have filed a motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. . 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: I can explain that in about a minute-
and-a-half. ' ' • 
. THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: I have represented Mr. Miller on some 
things for a lengthy period of time. We were aware -- I was 
aware of this charge pending, but Mr. Miller was out of the 
State. I told him the first thing he needed to do when he got 
back to Utah was to call me so we could set up a time to come in 
here. 
Somehow or another he got back to Utah without calling 
me, he got picked up on the warrant. Somebody in this court told 
him I had withdrawn as his attorney. He was assigned a public 
defender and entered a plea agreement without my knowledge.. I 
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only found out about it recently, and I filed as quickly as I 
possibly could a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
THE COURT: This occurred — I want to make sure the 
record is clear. He was appointed an attorney on July 28th by 
Judge Medley. I don't know anything about — I know you were on 
the case because — • 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: If you can find my withdrawal I'd like 
to see the signature on it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Oh, I'm not saying that there was a 
withdrawal. I don't even know if anybody — you took an 
interlocutory appeal, it looks like. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes, I did. I won my second 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Then let's see, he was-- July 28th he was 
arraigned, and I don't know that any — that he advised anybody 
or if it's on the record anywhere that he advised that you were 
still representing him. I don't know. It just shows here that 
he was appointed an attorney by Judge Medley. 
COURT CLERK: He was (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: I didn't know. Nobody told me a thing. 
THE COURT: He should have said something. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: He should have, your Honor. I think he 
was confused. I think he was led somewhere to believe that I had 
withdrawn. 
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THE COURT: Well, there's nothing in the record here 
that shows that. It just shows he was appointed an attorney, and 
there's no indication of any kind of a withdrawal or anything. 
If someone hadn't told Judge Medley, all he's looking at is the 
Information. So he wouldn't know that you represented him. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, I understand that, but you know, 
obviously if I had known I had been here. Now the problem — 
THE COURT: Well, I appreciate that. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: The problem is this, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Does he want to withdraw his plea? Is 
that .— 
MR.. MCCULLOUGH: Yeah. Well, let me give you a caveat 
here. I've seen the pre-sentence report. It says 60 days with 
credit for time served. He tells me he's been there 57, so 
that's enough. He's got a $5,000 warrant hold on him from South 
Salt Lake. Counsel tells me that if we withdraw the guilty plea 
today, he wants to continue to hold him. I don't want to -— 
THE COURT: That's a good deal, unless he didn't do it. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, your Honor, legally he didn't, do' 
it. 
motion. 
THE COURT: That he believes he didn't do it. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: I understand the Court has denied my 
THE COURT: Uh-huh.. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: I firmly believe the Court of Appeals 
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will disagree. What I'd like to do is convert it so a Sery, but 
that would require the State's concurrence, and they're not going 
to concur. His brother is here, your Honor. He's got a job. 
What I really need you to do is not only let me withdraw the 
guilty plea, but let him out. 
THE COURT: Well, I can't let him out. He's already 
being held on — 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, right, pending — I mean, you 
know, obviously not — you can only do what you can do. South 
Salt Lake has got a hold, and we'll have to deal with South Salt 
Lake. His brother is here. He's got a place to live. He's got 
a job to go to. Your Honor, I've represented this guy for years. 
He'll come to court. If you fully understood his mess with the 
system, the system has messed with him, you'd be pretty 
sympathetic. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure I'm opposed to releasing 
him to pre-trial. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, in that case we want to withdraw 
the guilty plea, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I guess we'd have to have a hearing. 
MR. STANGER: I don't know that Counsel's motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea addresses the necessary (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, I guess the problem — 
MR. STANGER: — what makes it (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, that's -- it is a problem 
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because he was represented by an attorney and we went through the 
colloquy with him and we have — she went through, the long form 
with him. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: I understand that, your Honor, but — 
THE COURT: And then he entered his plea. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: The crime to which he pled does not 
exist. 
THE COURT: Well, that's your position, but he pled to 
it and I'm going to — I accepted the plea.. So unless you can 
convince me that the appellate court in a written opinion is 
going to say that it's — there's no such crime, he's stuck. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, they are going to say that, your 
Honor, if you'll give them a chance. 
THE COURT: No. No. I'm not going to allow him to 
withdraw his plea. What do you want to do about sentencing? 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: That's a final decision? You're not 
going to — 
THE COURT: That's correct. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, in that case we'll go ahead with 
sentencing today, your Honor. I've seen the report. Have you 
seen the report? Could I have a few minutes with him in the 
back? 
THE COURT: Do you have a copy of it? 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: I don't, but thank you. 
MR. STANGER: Judge, I have a — I'm covering the Rees 
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calender, if I could leave it with the prosecutor here. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. STANGER: I was planning on submitting on the pre-
sentence report. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. STANGER: Thank you. 
(Court handles other matters) 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Your Honor, could we come back maybe to 
Mr. Miller? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
(Short recess taken) 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Your Honor, I have gone over the 
probation report, pre-sentence report with Mr. Miller. We don't 
disagree with .the conclusions. I do want — did want the Court 
to know that his brother is here, that he has a place to live in 
Salt Lake, and that is brother also believes that he has work 
available. I think Harry has always had work. I mean he doesn't 
avoid work. I think the report says 60 days with credit for 60 
days. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not — I'm going to release him 
today. He's going to be on probation. He has nothing to be 
concerned about as far as remaining in jail. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: Fine. 
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1 THE COURT: So I'm going to give him an A — a year in 
2 jail on the A I should say — suspended — 18 months probation 
3 with Salt Lake County. He won't be supervised by AP&P but Salt 
4 Lake County. I require him to complete a substance abuse 
5 evaluation and comply with any recommended treatment. If there 
6 is other programming that they deem necessary or something that 
7 will benefit him, he will be required to do that. I want him 
8 to do 40 hours of community service in the first year of his 
9 probation. No alcohol or drugs while on probation, and submit 
10 to random testing. Okay? 
11 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Thank you, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: He'll be released today. 
13 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: Make sure you get over the Salt Lake County 
15 and get signed up, okay? Do you know what I mean by that, sir? 
16 They'll give you a referral. 
17 (Hearing concluded) 
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That this proceeding was transcribed under my 
direction from the transmitter records made of these 
proceedings. 
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transcript, as an independent contractor working under 
my license as a certified court reporter appropriately 
authorized under Utah statutes. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and 
contains all of the evidence and all matters to which the 
same related which were audible through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore, the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker. 
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Natalie Lake 
Certified Court Transcriber 
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